Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983

Hansen's Farm Supply, Inc v. Paul Fjeldsted dba Fjeldsted Oil
Company : Brief of Respondent

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Don E. Olsen; Attorneys for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Hansen's Farm Supply v. Fjeldsted, No. 18989 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4519

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HANSEN'S FARM SUPPLY, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent

Case No. 18989

vs
PAUL FJELDSTED dba
Fjeldsted Oil Co.,
Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

AN APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge

DALE M. DO RIUS
Attorney for Appellant
29 South Main Street
P.O. Box "U"
84302
Brigham City, Utah

DONE. OLSEN
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent
Attorneys for Respondent
1100 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

FI l ED

1 llC SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

i"<

!11\!.SEl\'S

SUPPLY, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent
Case No. 18989

PA UL F JELDSTED dba
F1cldsted Oil Co.,
Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Al\ APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge

DALE M. DO RIUS
Attorney for Appellant
29 South Main Street
P.O. Box "U"
84302
Brigham City. Utah

'

ll

Coke-- & Vincent

,

'-11·
11111
I

;

Rt·.spo11dent
•\,.' 1,,.

! ,; •

E1 1ildir1g

('1t \'

lltC-1h

8411 l

l /\BLE OF CONTENTS

1

Ar)-'

t o'.

,

'1:1,(

f'( int

thr

of the Case

r,:

3

1

'HE B l 1 c;r NESS RECORDS EXCEPTION OF THE
..·'.F'.c;AY RULE DOES NOT SPECIFY THAT RECORDS
''""f'·'.vlC!' BY A THIRD PARTY WHO IS NEITHER
,'.'.· C:.l?LOYEE NOR AGENT OF THE PROFFERING
i ARTY ARE INADMISSIBLE SOLELY BECAUSE OF
TflAT FACT

3

THERE ARE NCMEROUS EXAMPLES OF COURTS
A!J\11J1ll;G RECORDS PREPARED BY A THIRD PARTY
lNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO
l Hr. HEAkSAY RULE, AN!J THIS COURT SHOULD
UC' Lil<fl\lSt. IN THIS CASE

4

])
rm: EVIDENCE IN QUESTION WAS IMPROPERLY
1:.11 r l LD. l H:t. ERROR \\'AS HARMLESS AND THE
COURT'S RULING SHOULD BE UPHELD

j'.

6
9

I ABLE OF CASES

Bethers. 552 P.Zd 128(, (Utah 1976)

\'

,,,uld"'' v.

Britton,

fu 11,,,-1 v. All«r ..

8h N.M.

775,

Zh C. Zd 821.

3

527 P.2d 1087 (1974)

161 P. 2d 4S2 (Cal.

1945)

Dov,];nid v.

(l_i(;,h

7

Good v. A. B. Chance Co. 565 P.Zd 217 (Colo.App. 1977)

4

Jr, re

4

152 Kan. 23,

11, re

·

103 P.2d 52 (1940)

428 P. 2d 725 (Wyo.

1967)

4

4
Philliu Var, Heusen. Inc. v, Korn, 2(14 Kan.
-

- -"(lyi,y'

172, 460 P.2d 549

Sliui«•line ProD. Inc. v. Deer-0-P;;mts & Chem. Ltd.,
530 P.Zd 760 (197'iJ

49 U. 9,
\',
\\'1i1ft

\.·.

K 1li1zi.m.

P . ...'.d

'''"'"" \

'.., v.1s.

161 P.

1120 (Utah

1916)

P.2d 1031 (Okla. 1975)
!-Jroducts, Inc.

72 Wash.

3Y4 P. 2d o8b (Alaska 1964)

7
4

Zd 22&,

4
4

TABLE OF ST A TU TES

kui<

bl ( ])) , Rules of Evidence,

(Utah 1971)

F1tlc (,],Rules of Civil Procedure (Utah 1953)

3. 5. 6
6, 9

I:; TflL SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Jl.l\r<SE':'c; Fl\RM SUPPLY. JNC.

Case No. 18989

Plaintiff and Respondent

l'l\llL FJELDSTED dba

F.kldstcd Oil Co.,

Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

S1 ATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plarn tiff - Respondent brought this action

to

recover amounts owed by

Deft·r.c.lant-Appellant on an open account with Plaintiff-Respondent, alleging
been delivered to Defendant-Appellant's place of business.

fuP1

DJSPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
r11v

Jud

CZiSC

was tried to the bench on Januetry 5, 1983, and the Honorable

Doll V. Tibbs ruled m
l 1 :d1 Supremt

l tll

1

favor of Respondent.

Appellant has appealed

Court.

RELJEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
l<"'f"""ient seeks to have the ruling of the Trial Court affirmed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1 ·,(.1(

J,,,

1·

•,d:-1r.t

is an owner/operator of a retail outlet for petroleum

wJ.,, lias had a long standing open account with Plaintiff-Respondent,

a

corporat1on which

to retailers.

pl

11-u!\·urT1 tiruduct:-; oJ.

Appe1lJ.nt has h1.c.toricJ.llv

products from Respondcllt on credit.

m;irlt·

1·(iu:-

11\HT1(

v.

.1

Ji. 1

l1lilt':-:.dll'

purch.i:--L':--

fH

(JJ

Respolldcnt billed J\ppl'llc"d

0 ,,

"

monthly basis based on in\'oices, m,:iny of whJch WC'Yl' un:->1f:T1ed, th,_d

11 ,_

the individual deliveries.
It was stipulated by the parties that of the hur1dreds of scpc1r"t'

1 , '"

actions occurring in the period of time set forth rn the Compl;iii,t. foui o\w
invoices comprised the unpaid and disputed balance of th<> uccour1t.
these was found to be an improper charge arid was disallowed.

Or,e u

The

1

csue

at triai was limited to whether the fuel represented bv the rnna11.1nll three
invoices was delivered to the Appe 11ant.
Respondent's president testified that because of the fuel
the time oer10d

111

J"r

question (T-17: 14-16) Appellant had placed a stancll!,8

for all the fuel that Respondent could deliver (T-24: 3-13; 25: 16-171.
was not denied by Appellant.

Appellant also admitted that it \\as

Tl"·

ruJ'

unusual for direct deliveries to be made to his business csl<:ihl:sh11"",i

(T-39: 11-22) and that frequently hE" ordi=r<:d, received ;:ir1d paid !or rn·,1, ·
items based on ur1signed invoices (T-40: 22-41: 20J.
Resp0r1dent 1s prec:.idf'nt a1so testified,

and subst.011iticitf'd bY ol1 1TlLC

evidence its own invoices. that he was present
were actually mddE (Tl

w}ic11

tht.·

r]\

31: 1-8) pur:::-.uar1t to tht-'

Appel1ar1t had with Rt!c:.j,CJT•d·-'fJt.

delivery ticket prepared bv a third l,;,rty.

;=dso ()ff,·rt·d

'1\ ('

(ird·
1111!>

Oil Procl11< t .

1

1 1rJi_·r,,

·' l'1< f,

Respondent 1 s prt.:s]dent tc-stifit'd he iriitict.1ll·d to ctckrJowlL·dgv d,·l1\

\_'f\

uL

:d

:

tlw

t11,

l

11 ·

1

rlc-]1\·crv

\Vd:)

This document was admitted into evidence by

rnctdc.

ul J udµc· m,dc·r the business records exception to the hearsay rule.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
T!!E Bl;SJNESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE DOES NOT
'.)J'LCIFY THAT RECORDS PREPARED BY A THIRD PARTY WHO IS NEITHER
!\N EMPLOYEE NOR AGENT OF THE PROFFERING PARTY ARE INADMISSIBLE
SOLEL 1 BECAUSE OF THAT FACT.

Rule 63(13). Rules of Evidence (Utah 1971) makes no distinction between
1·<·cords which were prepared by the proffering party or its employees or agents
ctn d records which were prepared by some other third party.
out cntcnc., which if met by

It merely lays

busir1ess record, allow that record to be

;,dm1tt<·cl into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.

All that is required

oJ a writ mg is ( 1) that it be offered as a m<:morandum or record of an act or
event rn order to prove the facts stated therein, and ( 2) that the judge make
" Jc\l'.rmrnalwn that it meets certain standards of reliabilitv and obJectivitv
s"ch as being ''made in the regular course of business at or about the time
uf the ctct'',

etc.

The Judge: is to be given cons1derctble d.J.scret1on in admitt1ng or re.iecting
'.·•Jc), n·1dv11cc.
;i]:-;(1,

·, '· i.

(1'.

tl11

])ambrough

·1:.

Bethers,

552 P. Zd 1286,

1290 (

Sf1orC'lint Proµ. lnc.. v. Deer-0-Pajnts & Chem. Ltd.,

c, lh P. Zd !GO.

760 ( 1975).

1976).
24 Ariz. App.

If the iucige finds a documem meets the criteria

liu.'->1ness record.'=> exception, it should be admitted regGt:rd1ess of whether
,,, , 0

,,r,·cl b) thE> proffering party or a third part\· and the trial court's

'·'""1!d <mh· be overturned after a clear showing that the trial judge

PU!f\ I

II

THERE ARE NUMEROUS EXA'.1PLES CH COl'I\ Is
l\IJ <Jl\llS
PREPARED BY A THIRD PAkTY llNULR fill P.llSif\J·:ss RFCORflS U:C.U' l ll•
TO THE HEARSAY RULE, AND TJIIS COUR 1 SHOULD !JO Llf:J \1'Jc,J. Jf, J llh
CASE.

Appellant is correct in his assert101i that Ut'1h casc·s to datl' h:tn· ror.]\
dealt with fact situations whcrem the record sought to Le admitted '" ,],.,. i;,.,
business records exception to the hear»dy rule had b<ceti prepan·d 1,v ar.
agent or employee withm the business entrty proffcruig it.
however, have a1lowed records

by disir1terested third pa.1·t1l'-"'

admitted under this exception if they mL't the criteria laid uut
See DeHart v. Allen,

26 C.2d

829.

by a process server was ctdmitted
ln re Davie's Estate.

152 Kan.

](.,] P.2d 453 (Cal.

in

23,

a suit

103

bct\\t·er1

1945),

11,

be

1<1

.rult..

tl1L'

(documc·rit !"•

a lessor arid ::1

P.2d 52 (1940),

(n·cordo, fH<·J>;,n·J "'

priests of the Catholic Church wcere admrtted to show certain facts about
intestate's alleµed father).

Hospital records have also bt-en aclm1ttl'd u11dcr

this exception by many surrounding jurisdictions in cases wert' tllt' hu.<->f!lLL

was a dis1nterested th1rd partv.
(Alaska 1964);

Good v. A.

Sec 7'.e1-lnnus v.

B. Ch:rnce Co ..

Boulden v. Britton.

86 N.111.

531 P.2d 1031 (Okla.

1975):

775.

P.2c.J ,,;..,(

565 P.2d 217 (Cnlu.A;>p. 1r,,·,,,

527 P.Zd 1087 (1974);

Mavor v. Dowsc-tt.

240 Or.

Sw\'dct•,
1%;

K
.'1'

.1[1,,

'd

(1965);
(1967); Jn re rv1orton 1 s Estate,

ln a case s1mllctr tu

of an open account, the

P.:::'.d

(\\-yu.

thl

Suprcrnt' l:cn1rt ,t11owt·cl

by a disinterested third party under the

bt1'->1t1t·:--,.'->

1r1

d cl<)(
( .,,\

1J:'1•

l·; 1 il< 1 11

t

J

11 •

tl,•

[,1

lt ',,\ \"

\',,1, llcus"r .. lrrc. v. Korn, 204 Kan.

l"lllt·

',.1 • I I 'J(,9).

Ir, th.<t

172, 460 P.Zd

th« rC'port of a credit reporting agency was allowed

111 tr• :-,how th·· dl'fl·r1d:n1t h:id made representations as to his willingness to

respor.s1hility for the· debts of his son's clothing store.

,,s'11m1·

cited ctbovc relied on the lJniform Business Records

Sl'vvral of the

as Evidence Act.

Paragraph 2 thereof states:

'A rcc_ord of an act, cond1t1or1 or event. shall, in so far as
rl'levant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other
qualified witness testifies as to its identity and the mode of
its prc•pccration, and if it was made in the regular course of
business. at or rJear the time of the act, coridition or event,
and if. in the opinion of thP court. the sources of information,
method and time of preparat101J were such as to justify its
1

1

Althuul.'h the lar,guage is r.o'. iclcr.tical to that found in Rule 63 (13),
P.ules of Evidence (Utah 1971), the criteria to be met is basically the same,

i.e., v..ritings which were made in the regular course of a Uusiness, at or
;:,bout the lime of the occ;yrrence, ar.d
ti ustworth1nc-ss.

as to their reliability and

Neither the Uniform Act nor the Utah Rule specifies that

ttrc- pcirty profferinf! the document must be the creator, but onlv that if
t }i,

cntenei are met. the- documer1t is tv be admitted.

cn1eria

WLTt·

lri 1hL'

thl· document was properly admitted.

met

at bar.

tL1rd P"rtv (T-27:8-10).
,,,

\ J
'>\'

(1r,

I.'

the Pxhjbit n1 question was admittedly

prepared by a

fiowever, it was also established that E1·val Hansen

],,,half of Respor1dt'r1t was prt>scnt when the delivery was made

14J. "' kr"rnled""d the n·cc1pt of the fuel at the time of delivery

rr,111 •.Jlrnl!

l1n 1· Jr'

In this case, the

the exh1b1t in question (Tl8: 12-17; 20:8-14), and that this was

the 0rci1I1ctrv

course of RC'spondent 1s business (T27: 15-17).

Ht·:-.n(l11dc,rit 1 s w1trit·ss tPst1f1t->d th3t

hP wJ.s physically present when the

initialling the delivery ticket at tlw 11111<· o! 111<· ,,, t

incorporating that delivery ticket into

n.:_'/:!Ulctr coursl' uf ln 1.c., 11 ,

and by actually witnessing the deli\'cry,

\\'Jtncss was also <tllk

ill

determine the trustworthiness of the documei1t.
There is adequate evidence to support the trial judge's findrngs th"t the
evidence which Appellant sought to exclude met the criteria of Rule 63 ( J j).
Rules of Evidence (Utah 1971) and was therefore properly admitted.

Gi,·mg

the deference due the trial judge's discretion as discussed in Point I ;;bove.
it is clear that the admission of the evidence in quc stion should be u;,Jwld.
There has been insufficient showing that the trial judge so abusc·d his discrct, 0 :,
as to justify overturning his ruling.
In this case, the Utah Supreme Court should follow the precedent set
in other jurisdictions and affirm the admission of a qualified business record
prepared by a disinterested third party under the business records C'.C1 ;11F1·.
to the hearsay rule.

This is particula.rly so where Respolldent m6dv :n, n.tn

of its own to the document by in1tialhnu

1t

and thereby acknow]edgir1'd..

rLc1::·1pl

of the product for its own records.
"OlNT Ill
EVEN IF THE EVIDENCE IN QliESTION WAS IMPROPERLY l\DMJT f}_D, TliL
ERROR \\'AS HARMLESS AND THE TRIAL COURT'S RL 1LlNG SHOULD Ri: i
Rule 61, Rules of Civil Procedure· (Utah 1W53) statc·s:
11 No error in either the .-dJr,11:-,s1or1 ur 1ht· e-xc1usiun of 1-\ HJr·rJl < •
and no l·rror or defect ui a11y ru.ir1g ur orUer or u1 dfJ\
done or om)t1ed by the: court or liy any of thl' p<1rllcs, i::, gr-'n1r1l 1
for granting a. new trial or othcrw1se d1sturb1ng ,1
or
order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the Lourt
inconsistent with substantial justice.
The court at everv ::.>tctv<·
of the proceed1ng must disref:!:ard anv error or Uef('ct ir1 tnv

pruu. Tcl1TJ.g which d(ws riut <.iffcct the substantial rights of
t 11(' fJ:1rtic:-,.'

lic ;,

tndl. the Ute!h Supreme Court recently elaborated on this

Jtll"V

'Assuming argucndo that the trial court erred in admitting
Dr. Lee's testimony. such error does not rise to the level of
prciudicial error urciess there is a reasonable likelihood that
the
would have reached a different result if the error
h;,d not occurred." Dowland v. Lvman Products for Shooters,
6·1c P.2d 380, 3Bl (Utah 1982)
The principle that an even more substantial error must occur before
rulrng in a non-jury trial will be reversed has been well established for
r:cny yc<lrS.

In '.'_pratt v-. Paulson, 49 Ut. 9, 161 P. 1120, 1122 (Utah 1916),

t ht· Court saici:
, ... if the; c;:;se had been tried by a jurv instead of by the court,
therv v.ould be no doubt respectrng our duty to reverse the case
upor; the ground that improper evidence was admitted against
the ddendant over his obJections and exceptions which were
[JYeJuclicial to his substarit1al rights.
In view, however, that the
c
was tried by the court, it is rns1sted by plaintiff that
c.lthough it were conceded the court erred in the particulars
rnst slatted, vet that there is at least some substantial evidence
ir1 support of the materia1 findings, and hence we may not
iriterlcre.
Counsel enc and rely upon the case of Victoria. etc.
Cu. v. Haws, 7 Utah 515, 27 Pac. 695, where the court lays down
th•· cJuctrir1f-' coritt·rided for in the fo11o\ving words:
'Wl1e1. the judge tr1es a cast without a jury, it is not a reversible
vrror to
ir1competent, irrelevant, or immaterial evidence;
for t1e deciues the
on thto proper testimony only. and disregards
r-r1111·LJY that which is 111comnPtt'nt. irrelevant, and immaterial.
When
tlil' c .it',ar prf'pondt-'rance of
relevant, and material evidence
1ht· f1·vlir1gs. this court \vill not reverse because of errors
uf the court bck>\"-' iri admltting incompetent, irrelevant, or immaterial
e\·idt_'11ce, for the p1·l;sumption ifl such case is that it was wholly
1

"

[· ic 1,nlikely th;,t Appellant car1 meet even the standard required in a
1ur\

ti-1;11

tCi

cnrnne1 an ovE'rturn1ng of the trial court 1s ruling let alone the

h 1 c he.,- st;rn cfard rf'ciuired for non-jury trials.

7

The only attempt Appellant

made to refute Respondent's al1cgc1t1orts w,1::was never made (T-38:2-3).

Evcri

only that he didn't know thty
weren't (T-39: 9-10).

th1:-i

th;:it Oil <J 1

1J\\ 1.

qu.dlfwd

\\d.<-·

dl·lnL·rcU,

bl·c.1u:-ic

nut that he

he

r1.il!ril

w<1;-,

.'>tJJT

th(')

Appellant did not den\· that h1· hau a standrng urdn

with Respondent for fuel.

He admitted that It was a common practicl'

j

01 -

him to purchase products on credit from Respondent without si gi 1in g- for
them (T-41: 12-20), and that other dirc>ct deliveries had becIJ mciclc to h 1 ,.
establishment (T-39: 11-17).
On the other hand, Respondent presented testimony by its presidc1d
that the deliveries were made ( T-18: 15-17), that ht wa>o

w·n,.r1

the

deliveries were made (T-18: 12-14; 31: 1-8), that htc n,itialcd the cxhilJ1t \\hicL
is at issue in this appeal at the time of delivery to eek nm\ i<'d/"c th.it 1l1L'
delivery had actually been made (T-20: 8-14).

Respondc·rd >oubst:rntiJtl'd

this testimony by offering iuto evidence ib own invmces for the same
deliveries (T-15: 7-19;

JS: 24-16: 10; 21: 12-22: 6;

22: 14-15).

Resuor1derd aJso

established that it was a common practice to make deliveries to Aprwlbrd
without having Appellant sign the invoice by its prc>oident's tcstrn1orl\
(T-7: 15-23; 28: 10-16; 29: 20-30: 4) and by Apµcl)z,rd's owr1 dd11.iss1uL
(T-40: 22-41: 20).
It is clear that even if Exh:bit #5 was

admJttL'ci

into t·YICll-r1cc' 11.

the error is not prejudjcia1 ctpply1ng either thf-' :Jta:idctrd for .unC's
standard for trial before a iudgc.

Because the :ncc.umpt1rn

c1 1 •

'1

! 11 1

1s th,d '"
11'

the question becomes whether-

;-i

p1·cDondcr<lr1c(" of

material evidence supports the finding.
be upheld.

compl'Tl'llt.

If so. thP trirtl

1·0J

I'.,

rt·1

r 1'."
1

is

\(

11
I

I1 '

] \

( '

this

l- i I

ct

c.icnying kr1owlcdge of the disputed

sir1gle

must bl' Wf·ighcd against an eye-witness 1 s testimony of delivery,

1ili:->L1t.tic1tvd hv invoices which were made in the regular course of
1

He:-,ti(1nderit s

business and whose trustworthiness was established by

cxt<'1"1vc testimony (T-7: 15-8: 25; 10: 5-23; 28: 10-16; 29: 20-30: 4; 40: 22-41: 20).
It is clear that the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial Judge's
fir,drngs, and they should be upheld.
Rule 61. Rules of Civil Procedure (Utah 1953) is controlling in this
CdSe.

Smee any error which may have occurred does not affect the substantial

ri12hts of the parties (according to the criteria given in case law as discussed
above) this court must disregard the error and refuse to disturb the trial
court's judgment and order.
CONCLUSION
The busiT1ess records exccpt10n to the hearsay rule makeo no distinction
hctv.er,r, records prepared by the proffering party ctnd those prepared by
d1smtcrested third parties.
lJus111ess

rule,
rd

lt simply lays out criteria. which if met. allow

document to be admitted into evidenc(; as an exception to the
Although the Utah Supreme Court hcts not yet addressed the

i1usu1c>ss

documents prepared by disinterested third parties, other

'<".1<·ts h;ivt' recognized this principle. and justice dictates that it should be

l,, ,,,,
11 1.1;

tr"

,

if the court finds that Exhibit #S was erroneously admitted, the

(Jut·t 1 :-, ruling

still be afiirmed because the error would not affect

culi,;tanti;,I 1·ights of the parties.

9

There was ample other evidence given

respectfu11v r1·quc:::its that 1hc 1-u;1nµ: of the Trial Court l)l
DatL'd tl11s {,th

cl.i\·

of Jur1c,

,Lffinned.

J'ltn.

BEJ\SLJN,
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Don E. Olsen

--

--

-
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